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1. Introduction 
The quality of domestic institutions plays a key role in shaping a country’s pattern of 
comparative advantage. Recent research has, in particular, identified two major 
institutional characteristics that matter for trade: i) the quality of contract enforcement 
as it affects the capability to specialize in relationship-specific industries (Nunn, 2007), 
and ii) the development of the financial system, as credit constraints may prevent firms 
from investing in R&D or market entry costs, which in turn can negatively affect their 
export performance (Manova 2008; Antràs and Caballero 2009). Little is known, 
however, about how trade is affected by the interaction of those aspects.  
We investigate the impact of equity market liberalizations in the period 1980-1997 on 
sectoral export performance across 91 countries. Our focus is on the differential impact 
of those liberalizations on industries with a varying degree of relationship-specificity. 
Following the classification by Nunn (2007), we think of a ǲspecific industryǳ as one 
where detailed contractual arrangements and unique investments of input suppliers and 
final goods producers are required, giving rise to hold-up and renegotiation issues.  
The recent theoretical literature (Carluccio and Fally, 2012; Antràs, Desai and Foley, 
2009), has shown that credit constraints may impede specialization in complex, 
relationship-specific industries. Possible mechanisms can be that firms are reluctant to 
source from, or to invest in, financially weak countries as they anticipate opportunistic 
behavior of their partners who face financial frictions; or because non-standard inputs 
require higher upfront investments which are more difficult to finance in such countries. 
The available evidence on the link between financial development and the relationship-
specificity of exports is mostly cross-sectional, however, which makes it difficult to 
establish a causal effect of finance. 
Our contribution is to address those issues from a dynamic perspective, by exploiting 
the drastic changes in domestic financial systems that came with the equity market 
liberalizations. We build on the approach by Manova (2008) who shows that these 
episodes can be regarded as an exogenous shock to the availability of external capital in 
the respective country, and do not capture simultaneous trade policy reforms or other 
institutional changes. While Manova (2008) focuses on the effect of liberalization on the 
export performance of sectors with different financial dependence, we extend that 
approach by evaluating the importance of relationship-specificity at the industry level.  
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We obtain two main findings. First, the financial liberalizations have disproportionally 
boosted exports of industries with a higher degree of relationship-specificity. Our panel 
results are thus consistent with previous cross-sectional evidence (Carluccio and Fally 
2012), and therefore support the view that financial frictions have a negative causal 
effect on the probability of specialization in complex industries. Second, even though 
trade volumes have increased on average after liberalization, our findings suggests that 
reforms of financial institutions generate winners and losers: Most sectors have higher, 
but some sectors have lower export volumes after liberalization. The industries’ 
relationship-specificity contributes more than external finance dependence to the 
understanding of this sectoral variation. 
 
2. Data 
The main data set for this study is from Manova (2008).1 It combines export flows for 27 
(3-digit ISIC) industries and 91 countries over the period 1980-1997 with country-level 
data on financial liberalizations, and sector-level data on financial vulnerability.  
The main variable capturing the event of liberalization is a dummy that is zero in all 
years before, and one in all years after the official equity market opening. 39 countries 
opened their domestic capital market to foreign equity flows during the observation 
period, while 16 countries liberalized prior to 1980 and 36 never liberalized.2 To classify 
sectoral financial vulnerability, Manova (2008) computes two variables: i) the external 
finance dependence as measured by the average ratio of capital expenditures minus 
cash flow to capital expenditures for the median firm in each industry in the US, and  
ii) asset tangibility, defined as the share of net property, plant and equipment in total 
book-value assets for the median US firm in that industry. 
To this data set, we merge the 3-digit ISIC sector-level information derived from Nunn 
(2007) which builds on the Rauch (1999) classification and input-output linkages in the 
US in 1997.3 There, the relationship-specificity of an industry is measured by the 
average fraction of inputs which are not bought and sold on an organized exchange 
                                               
1 The data are available under http://www.stanford.edu/~manova/EMLdata.dta.  
 
2
 We also use three alternative measures, namely: iiȌ a similar dummy referring to the ǲfirst signǳ of an 
upcoming liberalization, iii) an index that is zero before, and ranges between zero and one in all years 
after the official liberalization, where the index value captures the reform intensity, and iv) an analogous index for the ǲfirst signǳ of liberalization. As further control variables we also use her country-level data 
on GDP and factor endowments. For all details about these data, see Manova (2008). 
3 The data are available under http://scholar.harvard.edu/nunn/pages/data-0. Below we also report 
several robustness checks related to this measure of relationship-specificity. 
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market and for which no international reference price exists. This index is available for 
all 27 sectors included in Manova (2008). Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics 
and correlations between the sectoral variables used in our study.  
 
Table 1: a) Descriptive statistics of the sectoral variables (N=27) 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Median 10th perc. 90th perc. Min Max 
Relationship-specificity 0.530 0.211 0.532 0.266 0.838 0.062 0.890 
External finance dependence 0.253 0.330 0.219 -0.140 0.767 -0.451 1.140 
Asset tangibility 0.304 0.137 0.301 0.132 0.458 0.075 0.671 
 
b) Correlation table between sectoral variables (N=27) 
  
Relationship 
specificity 
External 
finance 
dependence 
Asset 
tangibility 
Relationship-specificity 1     
External finance dependence 0.399** 1   
Asset tangibility -0.665*** -0.041 1 ***,  **, *, indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
The data show that machinery or scientific equipment are among the most, and tobacco 
and non-ferrous metals are among the least specific industries. Furthermore, more 
specific industries tend to rely more on external finance, although there are also some 
exceptions (e.g., leather products), and they tend to have lower asset tangibility.  
 
3. Estimation 
We investigate the differential impact of financial liberalization on sectoral exports by 
estimating the following panel specification that is similar as in Manova (2008): 
0 1 0 1 2
3 1
       
  
cit ct ct ct i ct i
ct i cit c i t cit
X GDP Lib Lib Spec Lib FinDep
Lib AssetTang Y
                         (1) 
citX  is the (log) export volume of industry i  in country c and year t .  ctGDP  is c ’s (log) 
gross domestic product, citY are further time-varying control variables, and the  ’s are 
country-, industry- and time-fixed effects. ctLib  is the liberalization dummy. iFinDep is 
the external finance dependence,  iAssetTang  the asset tangibility, and  iSpec  the 
degree of relationship-specificity in sector i . In all regressions we cluster the standard 
errors at the country level. 
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Our focus is on the interaction terms. Manova (2008) has only included 2  and 3.  We 
introduce 1 , which is identified from the variation of equity market openness across 
countries over time, and the variation of relationship-specificity across industries.  
1  thus estimates the comparative advantage of financially more open countries in 
industries with a higher degree of specificity. 
The three variables iSpec , iFinDep  and iAssetTang  have been centered around their 
respective mean, so that 0  can be interpreted as the predicted increase of exports after 
liberalization for an industry with mean values of those characteristics. This rescaling 
has no impact on the estimates (or standard errors) of the interaction terms 1 , 2  and
3 .4 Notice further that the direct effects of iSpec , iFinDep  and iAssetTang  on citX
are captured by the industry-fixed effect i   
 
4. Main results 
Table 2 shows our main results. In the first column, we replicate Manova’s ȋʹͲͲͺȌ main 
finding (see column 3 of her Table 2). Conditional on GDP, general time trends, and time-
invariant characteristics captured by the country- and industry-fixed effects, she finds a 
disproportionally large effect of liberalization on the exports of sectors with higher 
external finance dependence ( 2 0   . In the second column we introduce 1  instead of 
2 , in the third column we jointly consider 1  and 2 , and in the fourth column we also 
add 3 , i.e., the interaction with respect to asset tangibility. We consistently estimate a 
strongly positive and highly significant coefficient 1 0  .5 That is, liberalization has 
disproportionally boosted exports of more relationship-specific industries.  
Furthermore, we find that the interaction term 2 remains positive and significant (see 
column 3), although it becomes substantially smaller than in column 1. The interaction 
term 3  is not significant, however, once we control for relationship-specificity. These 
findings are important to set our results into perspective to Manova (2008).  
First, we find that financial liberalization seems to generate winning and losing sectors. 
Our results in column 3 imply that the export volume is predicted to rise after 
liberalization ( 0 1 2 0i iSpec FinDep       ) in 20 out of 27 industries, with values 
                                               
4 Without the centering of the sectoral characteristics, Ⱦ0 would have captured the effect of liberalization 
for a hypothetical industry where Speci, FinDepi and AssetTangi are all equal to zero. As can be seen from 
Table 1, such a sector does not exist as Speci, and AssetTangi  are always larger than zero in the data. 
5 We also test for the joint significance of Ⱦ0+Ⱦ1. The last row reports the Wald Chi-Square test and the 
respective p-value. As can be seen, the two terms are also jointly significant. An alternative Wald test for 
the hypothesis Ⱦ0=Ⱦ1=0 yields very similar results. 
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ranging up to 123% in the Scientific equipment sector. Exports are negatively affected, 
however, in 7 cases with changes as large as -51% in the petroleum refineries. The 
impact of financial development on trade is therefore economically substantial and 
strongly heterogeneous across sectors. An intuition may be that the general increase in 
the availability of external capital in the economy induces tougher selection and 
reallocation of credit, so that some sectors even end up exporting less than before.   
 
Table 2: Estimation results 
  
 
Official Liberalization Dummy 
First Sign 
Liberalization 
Dummy 
Official 
Liberalization 
Intensity 
First Sign 
Liberalization 
Intensity Liberalization ȋȾ0) 0.333*** 0.333*** 0.332*** 0.332*** 0.318*** 0.742*** 0.845*** 
 
(0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.088) (0.206) (0.213) 
        
Liberalization ×  1.892*** 1.548*** 1.979*** 1.993*** 2.971*** 3.018*** 
relationship-specificity ȋȾ1)  (0.242) (0.233) (0.319) (0.319) (0.357) (0.360) 
 
       
Liberalization × external 0.946*** 
 
0.557*** 0.466*** 0.536*** 0.482*** 0.508*** finance dependance ȋȾ2) (0.132) 
 
(0.120) (0.121) (0.127) (0.166) (0.173) 
 
Liberalization ×   
 
 
0.866 0.735 2.178*** 2.182*** 
asset tangibility ȋȾ3)  
 
 (0.592) (0.591) (0.748) (0.749) GDP ȋȽ1) 0.872*** 0.869*** 0.870*** 0.870*** 0.891*** 1.006*** 1.002*** 
 
(0.268) (0.268) (0.268) (0.268) (0.270) (0.263) (0.263) 
Controls  Exporter, year and sector F. E. 
R-squared 0.795 0.795 0.796 0.796 0.797 0.797 0.797 
# observations 39,568 39,568 39,568 39,568 39,568 39,568 39,568 
# exporters 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
Joint significance test  
Wald test on Ⱦ 0 + Ⱦ1 
Prob > F  
71.38 
0.000 
 
53.36 
0.000 
45.58 
0.000 
45.35 
0.000 
82.04 
0.000 
83.97 
0.000 
 
The dependent variable is the log of exports to the world by 3-digit ISIC sector, 1980–1997. The ofﬁcial and ﬁrst sign 
liberalization dummies and intensities, external ﬁnance dependence, and asset tangibility are deﬁned as in Manova (2008). 
Relationship specificity is defined as in Nunn (2007) as the fraction of inputs neither bought nor sold on an exchange market 
nor reference priced, using the conservative classification by Rauch (1999). All sectoral variables have been centred around 
their respective mean. GDP is the log of the exporter's GDP. All regressions include a constant term, exporter, year and sector 
ﬁxed effects, and cluster errors at the exporter level. Standard-errors reported in parentheses. ***,  **, *, indicate signiﬁcance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
Further comparing our results with Manova (2008), her main conclusion is supported 
by our analysis insofar, as we also find that the export volume tends to increase more in 
sectors with higher external finance dependence. However, our results suggest that the 
differential relationship-specificity across industries is considerably more important 
when it comes to explaining the sectoral variation in the effect of liberalization on trade.  
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Table 3: Predicted changes in sectoral export volumes 
  
Financial Dependence (FinDepi) 
 
  
10th percentile 
(-0.393) 
Median 
(-0.034) 
90th percentile 
(0.514) 
R
e
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
-s
p
e
c
if
ic
it
y
 
(S
p
e
c
i)
 
 
10th percentile 
(-0.264) 
-0.296 -0.096 0.210 
    
Median  
(0.002) 
0.116 0.316 0.621 
    
90th percentile 
(0.308) 
0.590 0.789 1.095 
    
 
Table reports the predicted change in export volume for different values of FinDepi and Speci (values of the centered 
variables are reported in parenthesesȌ, using the estimated coefficients Ⱦ0, Ⱦ1 and Ⱦ2 from Table 1, column 3. 
Prediction is computed as Ⱦ0 + Ⱦ1 Speci + Ⱦ2 FinDepi 
 
 
To show this more specifically, Table 3 reports the predicted changes in export volumes 
for different percentiles of iFinDep  and iSpec . Suppose iFinDep  is hypothetically held 
fixed at its median value (so that the centered variable becomes 0.219-0.253=-0.034), 
while iSpec  varies from the 10th percentile (-0.264) to the 90th percentile (0.308). The 
predicted export changes then range from -9.6% to +78.9%, thus spanning around 90 
percentage points. By contrast, holding iSpec  fixed at the median (0.002), predicted 
export changes only vary by about 50 percentage points (from 11.6% to 62.1%) when 
raising  iFinDep  from the 10th to the 90th percentile.  
 
5. Robustness checks 
Columns 5-7 of Table 2 show that our baseline results remain robust when using the ǲfirst sign of liberalizationǳ dummy or the indicators of reform intensity instead of the 
official liberalization dummy. This is important, because a causal interpretation of the 
results requires that the equity market openings provide an exogenous shock to the 
availability of external capital, and do not capture other institutional changes that have 
occurred because countries anticipated future financial deregulations. Those concerns 
about possible anticipation effects are allayed. 
 
TABLE 4 HERE 
Table 4 provides three further robustness checks. First, in columns 1-4 we control for traditional sources of comparative advantage, namely the countries’ ȋtime-varying) 
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factor endowments with physical capital  , human capital  , and natural resources  , 
and interactions of those with (time-invariant) factor intensities across industries. 6 In 
line with factor proportions theory of international trade, we find that countries tend to 
export goods that intensively use their abundant factor. Importantly, our main result 
remains robust: the coefficient 1 0   is highly significant, regardless of how the 
liberalizations are conceptualized.  
Second, in columns 5-8 we repeat the exercise, but now focus on those countries that 
actually liberalized their equity markets during the observation period. Thereby our 
coefficients are now only identified from such countries where export flows can be 
observed both before and after a financial deregulation. Our main results remain qualitatively unchanged when focusing on this subsample of ǲswitchersǳ, the only 
exception being in column 6.  
Third, in columns 9-12 we follow Manova’s ȋʹͲͲͺȌ ǲevent studyǳ approach and use a 
fixed effect ci  for every country   industry pair instead of separate fixed effects c  and 
i  in eq. (1).  This setup takes into account that there may have been pair-specific 
unobserved differences driving export performance parallel to a liberalization event.  
It is considerably more demanding than the specification in (1), since identification now 
purely comes from within-country changes in trade over time, thus attributing the key 
role to the time variation. The results show that, unlike 2  and 3 which now turn 
insignificant, our main coefficient 1 0   remains robust, column 10 being the only 
exception. The ǲevent studyǳ thus corroborates our earlier finding that financial 
liberalizations disproportionally boost exports of more specific industries, although the 
quantitative magnitudes are now somewhat smaller than before.7 
Finally, we have also conducted robustness checks with respect to Nunn’s ȋʹͲͲ͹Ȍ 
measure of relationship-specificity. In particular, for the share of inputs not sold on an exchange market, Rauch ȋͳͻͻͻȌ provides a ǲconservativeǳ and a ǲliberalǳ definition. 
Furthermore, he also suggests that the information on the reference prices may be 
omitted when computing the sectoral index of specificity, which is then only computed 
as the share of inputs not bought or sold on organized exchange market (in a 
                                               
6 Factor endowments are not available in all cases. This is why the number of observations drops from 91 
to 70 countries in columns 1-4, and why we cannot include all 39 but only 33 ǲswitchingǳ countries in 
columns 5-8. For the event study setup in columns 9-12, we return to the sample of 70 countries. 
7 We have also reproduced Table 2 using pair-specific fixed effects ηci instead of ηc and ηi. Our main result remains: Ⱦ1 > 0 robustly holds, and using these coefficients to build an analogue to Table 3, our results still 
suggest that specificity adds more than finance dependence to the understanding how liberalization 
affects sectoral export volumes. 
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ǲconservativeǳ or a ǲliberalǳ definition). The results reported so far refer to the ǲconservativeǳ definition, and use the information on the reference prices. As a 
robustness check, we have reproduced Table 2 also for the three alternative measures of 
relationship-specificity.  The detailed results are omitted for brevity, but it turns out that 
our main results are robust throughout. That is, 1 0   holds in all specifications, with 
statistical significance at the 1% level in all cases. Results also remain robust (with 
statistical significance in the vast majority of cases) when reproducing Table 4, that is, 
when adding factor endowments as controls, when focusing only on the ǲswitchersǳ, or 
when conducting the ǲevent studyǳ analysis. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The longitudinal design of our study identifies the causal effect of financial liberalization 
on sectoral export performance. Our panel and event study results show that those 
equity market openings have disproportionally boosted exports of industries with a 
higher degree of relationship-specificity. Furthermore, our results indicate that exports 
of relatively standardized sectors are negatively affected by financial liberalizations. The 
differential relationship-specificity across industries is more important than the 
differential reliance on external capital when it comes to explaining the sectoral 
variation in the effect of liberalization on trade. 
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Table 4: Robustness checks 
 
Official 
liberalization 
dummy 
First sign 
liberalization 
dummy 
Official 
liberalization 
intensity 
First sign 
liberalization 
intensity 
Official 
liberalization 
dummy 
First sign 
liberalization 
dummy 
Official 
liberalization 
intensity 
First sign 
liberalization 
intensity 
Official 
liberalization 
dummy 
First sign 
liberalization 
dummy 
Official 
liberalization 
intensity 
First sign 
liberalization 
intensity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Controlling for factor endowments - All countries Switchers only Event study setup 
Liberalization ȋȾ0) 0.308*** 0.309*** 0.544** 0.649*** 0.042 0.012 0.175 0.162 0.287*** 0.291*** 0.487** 0.585** 
 
(0.094) (0.098) (0.207) (0.234) (0.065) (0.078) (0.212) (0.258) (0.100) (0.104) (0.207) (0.236) 
Liberalization ×  2.150*** 2.133*** 3.273*** 3.358*** 0.705* 0.612 3.090*** 3.053*** 0.491* 0.409 1.030** 1.146** 
relationship-specificity ȋȾ1) (0.369) (0.378) (0.433) (0.440) (0.373) (0.404) (0.658) (0.891) (0.278) (0.283) (0.488) (0.507) 
 
Liberalization × external 0.365** 0.400** 0.407** 0.426** 0.294* 0.285* 0.499 0.056 0.135 0.134 0.080 0.062 
finance dependence ȋȾ2) (0.148) (0.155) (0.190) (0.197) (0.145) (0.140) (0.451) (0.336) (0.112) (0.118) (0.219) (0.250) 
 
Liberalization ×  -0.049 -0.219 0.505 0.415 -1.255* -1.484** -0.694 -0.633 -0.370 -0.478 -0.663 -0.939 
asset tangibility ȋȾ3) (0.632) (0.618) (0.929) (0.938) (0.643) (0.657) (1.303) (1.640) (0.375) (0.389) (0.601) (0.640) 
 
GDP ȋȽ1) 0.405 0.398 0.564 0.551 1.001* 0.953* 1.052* 0.985* 0.460 0.451 0.607* 0.595 
 
(0.333) (0.337) (0.343) (0.344) (0.561) (0.551) (0.557) (0.542) (0.354) (0.357) (0.363) (0.363) 
K/L 0.358 0.382 0.311 0.314 -0.289 -0.282 -0.372 -0.331 0.200 0.249 0.224 0.241 
 
(0.306) (0.302) (0.318) (0.314) (0.585) (0.579) (0.584) (0.570) (0.442) (0.433) (0.452) (0.444) 
H/L -0.302 -0.355 -0.233 -0.273 -0.226 -0.111 -0.208 -0.032 1.465 1.408 1.594* 1.538 
 
(0.534) (0.543) (0.557) (0.562) (0.879) (0.885) (0.881) (0.873) (0.883) (0.916) (0.922) (0.944) 
N/L 0.230 0.243 0.077 0.096 0.375 0.585 0.268 0.479 -0.275 -0.267 -0.451 -0.433 
 
(0.519) (0.514) (0.522) (0.513) (1.431) (1.434) (1.457) (1.460) (0.592) (0.587) (0.597) (0.589) 
K/L × K intensity 2.352** 2.484** 2.782** 2.947*** 3.012* 3.641** 3.868** 4.155** 4.373 4.112 3.858 3.811 
 
(0.945) (0.947) (1.064) (1.091) (1.519) (1.579) (1.645) (1.749) (2.638) (2.603) (2.631) (2.586) 
H/L × H intensity 0.830** 0.841*** 0.812** 0.811** 0.446 0.312 0.392 0.196 -0.953* -0.939 -1.027* -1.009* 
 
(0.315) (0.313) (0.318) (0.318) (0.680) (0.675) (0.674) (0.656) (0.561) (0.572) (0.573) (0.581) 
N/L × N intensity 0.110* 0.096 0.132** 0.128** 0.128 0.108 0.123 0.128 1.254*** 1.262*** 1.422*** 1.411*** 
 
(0.061) (0.060) (0.063) (0.063) (0.076) (0.077) (0.076) (0.079) (0.295) (0.295) (0.302) (0.300) 
Controls Country, industry and year fixed effects Fixed effects for country*industry pairs, year fixed effect 
R-squared 0.808 0.808 0.809 0.809 0.700 0.685 0.701 0.684 0.938 0.938 0.938 0.938 
# observations 31,971 31,971 31,971 31,971 15,800 15,314 15,800 15,314 31,971 31,971 31,971 31,971 
# countries 70 70 70 70 33 32 33 32 70 70 70 70 
Joint significance test  
Wald test on Ⱦ 0 + Ⱦ1 
Prob > F 
38.15 
0.000 
35.63 
0.000 
61.66 
0.000 
62.90 
0.000 
3.24 
0.081 
2.01 
0.167 
21.11 
0.000 
11.81 
0.002 
 
4.378 
0.016 
 
4.029 
0.022 
 
3.130 
0.050 
 
3.783 
0.027 
 
The dependent variable is the log of exports to the world by 3-digit ISIC sector, 1980–1997. See Manova (2008) and legend to Table 2 for definitions. All sectoral variables have been centred around their respective mean. 
Regressions 1-8 include a constant term, country, year and industry ﬁxed effects. Regressions 9-12 include a constant term, year ﬁxed effects and fixed effects for country*industry pairs. In regressions 1-4 and 9-12 we 
include all 70 countries for which factor endowments data is available. In regressions 5-8 we include only those 33 out of 70 countries where the respective liberalization indicator changed from zero to a positive value 
during the observation period. Standard errors are clustered at the country level and are reported in parentheses. ***,  **, *, indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.  
